

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-20 NSC-10 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 ACDA-19 AEC-11 OIC-04 H-03 DRC-01 /149 W

----- 130138

P R 302100Z NOV 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2996

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3503

SUNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USLOSACLANT

USCINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5836

E.O. 11652: 12/31/79

TAGS: MCAP, NATO

SUBJECT: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING: SYG'S SUMMARY APPRAISAL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SYG LUNS' SUMMARY APPRAISAL (DPC/D(73)

34) WHICH IS AGENDA ITEM II FOR DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING:

BEGIN TEXT:

SUMMARY APPRAISAL BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL

INTRODUCTION

AS WE APPROACH THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE  
TREATY, WE MAY STATE WITH SATISFACTION, ONCE AGAIN, THAT THE  
PEACE OF EUROPE AND THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN WORLD HAS BEEN  
MAINTAINED FOR NEARLY A QUARTER OF A CENTURY. THIS HAS BEEN  
ACHIEVED BECAUSE NATO HAS SUCCEEDED IN DETERRING THE SOVIET UNION  
FROM USING ITS MILITARY POWER FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ENDS  
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IN EUROPE, HAVING CONVINCED THEM THAT THE RISKS THEY WOULD RUN  
IN DOING SO WOULD NOT BE WORTH ANY GAINS THEY MIGHT ACHIEVE.  
BUT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT HESITATED TO USE FORCE, OR THE  
THREAT OF FORCE, WHERE SUCH A DETERRENT DID NOT EXIST: AGAINST

HER ALLIES, AGAINST THE CHINESE, OR INDIRECTLY IN SUPPORT OF THE STRATEGIC AIMS OUTSIDE EUROPE. HERE RECENT INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS ONLY THE LATEST AND MOST STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THE LAST.

#### THE SOVIET VIEW OF DETENTE

2. NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT THEIR LOUDLY DECLARED PURSUIT OF DETENTE HAS SLOWED TO ANY PERCEPTIBLE DEGREE THE VAST MOMENTUM OF THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP. NOT FOR THEM THE COMFORTABLE ANTICIPATION OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON SALT AND MBFR; NOT FOR THEM THE SWITCH OF NATIONAL RESOURCES FROM DEFENCE INTO SOCIAL BENEFITS AND THE COMFORTS OF MODERN SOCIETY. THE REAL VALUE OF SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURE HAS RISEN STEADILY OVER THE LAST TWELVE YEARS AND NOW EQUALS THAT OF THE UNITED STATES; AS A PROPORTION OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MILITARY BUDGET FAR EXCEEDS THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS EFFORT IS REFLECTED IN THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP OF SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY IN ALL FIELDS: THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW AND IMPROVED STRATEGIC MISSILE SYSTEMS THAT THREATEN TO UPSET THE DELICATE BALANCE ESTABLISHED BY THE INTERIM SALT AGREEMENT; THE MODERNISATION OF THEIR LAND AND AIR FORCES FACING US ACROSS THE IRON CURTAIN; THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HIGH-SEAS NAVY NEARLY EQUAL TO THE UNITED STATES. NOR ARE THE SOVIET FORCES SHORT OF MANPOWER. THE SOVIET CITIZEN STILL SPENDS TWO YEARS IN UNIFORM.

3. IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT WE HAVE SEEN SOMETHING OF THE QUALITY OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH, HOW RAPIDLY IT CAN BE DEPLOYED, AND HOW EFFECTIVELY IT CAN BE USED, EVEN IN THE HANDS OF OTHERS. WE HAVE ALSO SEEN HOW SUCCESSFULLY IT CAN BE COUNTERED BY RESOLUTE ACTION.

4. LOOKING AT THE HISTORY OF THESE EVENTS IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES OVER A LONG PERIOD THERE ARE MANY LESSONS FOR NATO. SOME WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO EVALUATE, BUT THERE ARE THREE BROAD CONCLUSIONS THAT SHOULD ALREADY BE CONFIDENTIAL

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EMPHASISED.

#### SOVIET AIMS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

5. THE FIRST LESSON FOR NATO IS ALL THIS IS THAT THE LONG-TERM AIMS OF SOVIET POLICY HAVE NOT ALTERED, AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT RENOUNCED THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING THEM. THUS THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE DETENTE WITHOUT IMPERILLING THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE, IS TO MAINTAIN THE STABILITY OF THE POWER BALANCE ACROSS THE IRON CURTAIN. ON THE SIDE OF THE WEST, THIS BALANCE MUST BE ACHIEVED BY THE DETERMINATION OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES TO PROVIDE ADEQUATELY FOR THEIR OWN DEFENCE,

BY THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL UNITED STATES FORCES IN EUROPE, AND BY THE LINK WHICH THE LATTER PROVIDE TO THE STRATEGIC DETERRENT. IF ANY OF THESE ELEMENTS OF WESTERN DEFENCE ARE WEAKENED WHILE SOVIET MILITARY POWER CONTINUES TO INCREASE, THE OVERALL DETERRENT EFFECT OF NATO FORCES MAY DECLINE TO THE POINT WHERE SOME OF THE OPTIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN EUROPE MAY APPEAR LESS DANGEROUS TO THE SOVIETS THAN THEY DO NOW.

#### THE QUESTIONABLE VALUE OF WARNING TIME

6. THE SECOND LESSON IS THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH THE TEMPERATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CAN CHANGE - FAR MORE QUICKLY INDEED THAN THE FORCES NECESSARY TO COUNTER ANY SUDDEN INCREASE IN THREAT CAN BE CREATED. IN THIS CONTEXT NATO NATIONS WOULD DO WELL TO REFLECT THAT WHATEVER DEGREE OF WARNING WE MIGHT EXPECT TO RECEIVE OF ANY MILITARY ACTION CONTEMPLATED BY THE SOVIET UNION (AND WE MIGHT RECEIVE NONE AT ALL), THIS WARNING WILL BE OF NO VALUE UNLESS WE ARE WILLING TO MAKE USE OF IT. THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO TAKE RAPID ACTION TO IMPROVE OUR DEFENCES IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING TENSION, EVEN AT THE RISK OF APPEARING PROVOCATIVE. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS FOR THE PEACETIME STRUCTURE OF OUR FORCES AND PLANS FOR TRANSITION TO WAR ARE SUBJECTS OF MORE THAN MERELY TOPICAL IMPORTANCE.

#### ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS

7. BUT THE THIRD LESSON WE SHOULD DRAW IS PERHAPS THE  
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MOST VITAL OF ALL - THAT THE WHOLE OF OUR MILITARY STRENGTH AND READINESS IS UNDERMINED IF THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE IS IN QUESTION. IN THE PAST, THIS SOLIDARITY HAS BEEN WELL TESTED IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PRESENTED A DIRECT MILITARY THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE. WE NOW NEED TO DEVELOP METHODS OF HARMONISING OUR RESPONSE TOWARDS SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE IMMEDIATE INTERESTS AND THE LONGER TERM STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE MAY NOT AT FIRST BE PERCEIVED IN IDENTICAL TERMS AMONG THE NATIONS.

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TRSE-00 SAJ-01 ACDA-19 AEC-11 OIC-04 H-03 DRC-01 /149 W

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P R 302100Z NOV 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2997

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3504

USNMR SHAPE

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8. FOR WHETHER WE ARE FACING THE RUSSIANS ACROSS A  
CONFERENCE TABLE OR ACROSS THE IRON CURTAIN - WE MAY BE SURE  
THAT THEY WILL NOT FAIL TO EXPLOIT ANY SIGN OF WEAKNESS OR  
DIVISION ON THE SIDE OF THE WEST. IT IS NOW FOR ALL THE NATIONS  
OF THE ALLIANCE, BUT PARTICULARLY PERHAPS FOR THE EUROPEANS,  
TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE STRENGTH OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS  
DOES NOT OUTWEIGH THE STRENGTH OF THEIR ATTACHMENT TO NATO,  
AND THAT THIS IN TURN IS REFLECTED IN THE SIZE AND QUALITY OF  
THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION WHICH EACH MAKES TO THE COMMON DEFENCE.  
THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS OWE IT TO THEIR PEOPLES - ON WHOM THE  
BURDEN FALLS - A FRANK AND REASONED PRESENTATION OF THE NECESSITY  
FOR OUR DEFENCES AND THE STRATEGIC CONCEPTS ON WHICH THEY ARE  
BUILT. IT CAN HARDLY BE MAINTAINED THAT THIS IS BEING DONE BY  
ALL GOVERNMENTS NOW.

THE MILITARY PROGRAMME AND ITS WEAKNESSES

9. THE RESULTS OF THE 1973 DEFENCE REVIEW, AS SUMMARIZED  
IN THE GENERAL REPORT(1) INDICATE WHETHER AND HOW THE COUNTRIES  
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OF NATO ARE RESPONDING TO THIS CHALLENGE.THE REVIEW INDICATES  
THE MEASURES WHICH NATIONS ARE TAKING TO CORRECT CURRENT  
WEAKNESSES, PARTICULARLY IN COUNTERING THE AREAS WHERE THE  
WARSAW PACT IS STRONGEST, E.G. IN TANKS AND AIRCRAFT, BUT  
EMPHASISES THAT THESE MEASURES ARE STILL BEING INTRODUCED ON  
TOO LIMITED A SCALE AND TOO SLOWLY.AS FOR THE FUTURE, THE  
REVIEW DRAWS ATTENTION TO A NUMBER OF CRITICAL SHORTCOMINGS IN  
OUR FORCES, WHICH, IF LEFT UNCORRECTED COULD UNDERMINE THE  
WHOLE STRUCTURE OF OUR COLLECTIVE DEFENCE. THEY CALL FOR AN  
EXTRA EFFORT, AND IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY WITHIN THE CAPACITY AND WILL  
OF NATIONS TO PROVIDE IT, REALISING THAT IT WILL PRODUCE A WHOLLY  
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR ABILITY TO DETER AND DEFEND  
OURSELVES AGAINST AGGRESSION.

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(1) DPC/D(73)23

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COLLABORATION AND RATIONALIZATION OF DEFENCE EFFORTS

10. THE MAIN NEED IS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND READINESS OF OUR FORCES AND THEIR CAPABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER AND TO SUPPORT ONE ANOTHER: TO SOME EXTENT THIS IS A MATTER OF MANNING AND TRAINING, BUT VERY LARGELY IT IS A MATTER OF EQUIPMENT. WE OWE IT TO OUR FORCES TO SEE THAT THEY ARE ADEQUATELY ARMED AND EQUIPPED TO FULFIL THE TASKS WE ASK OF THEM, THAT THE WEAPONS IN THEIR HANDS ARE NO LESS ADVANCED AND EFFECTIVE THAN THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT, AND THAT THEIR ABILITY TO OPERATE TOGETHER AS AN EFFICIENT AND COHERENT WHOLE IS NOT INHIBITED BY UNNECESSARY INCONSISTENCIES OF EQUIPMENT OR SUPPLIES. THIS NEED BECOMES THE GREATER AS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT ON FORCE REDUCTIONS DRAWS NEARER. MEANWHILE WE MUST SPEND MORE ON MATERIAL BUT NO LESS ON PERSONNEL, AND EXPLOIT TO THE FULL THE ADVANTAGES WHICH MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION CAN OFFER US IN THE FIELD OF DEFENCE.

11. ONE MAJOR OPPORTUNITY FOR JOINT ACTION IN THE EQUIPMENT FIELD OFFERS ITSELF HERE AND NOW. MANY COUNTRIES WHOSE AIR FORCES ARE EQUIPPED WITH THE F104G AIRCRAFT ARE FACED WITH THE NECESSITY OF REPLACING IT WITH A MORE MODERN TYPE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS PROVIDES A UNIQUE OCCASION FOR COUNTRIES TO

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REAP THE OPERATIONAL, LOGISTIC AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PROCURING WEAPON SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE SAME BASIC TYPE; TO MISS IT WOULD BE UNFORGIVABLE.

12. AS HAS BEEN RECOGNISED SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE ALLIANCE, THE DEFENCE OF THE WESTERN WORLD CAN NO LONGER BE ACHIEVED BY NATIONAL EFFORTS ALONE. THE EFFORT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE DEFENCE IN EUROPE IS SUCH THAT THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE WILL NOT BE PUT TO BEST USE UNLESS THEY ARE ALIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONCEPTS OF DEFENCE WHICH TRANSCEND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES. ECONOMIC PRESSURES HAVE ALREADY FORCED SOME BREACHES IN THE IDEA THAT NATO DEFENCE POLICY CAN ONLY BE BASED UPON THE SUM TOTAL OF SELF-SUFFICIENT INDEPENDENT FORCES; FURTHER PROGRESS DOWN THIS ROAD WILL BE POLITICAL AND MILITARY AS WELL AS AN ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE. FOR EUROPE TO PLAY ITS PROPER PART MUST INEVITABLY DEMAND MUCH SPEEDIER PROGRESS THAN WE HAVE YET ACHIEVED TOWARDS THE INTEGRATION AND RATIONALIZATION OF DEFENCE EFFORTS AMONG THE EUROPEAN NATIONS. IT WOULD BE BETTER, HOWEVER, IF THIS WERE ACHIEVED AS A MATTER OF WILL RATHER THAN NECESSITY.

NEED FOR FRESH EFFORTS

13. BUT THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCH PROGRESS CAN ONLY BE MAINTAINED IF THERE EXISTS A CONSENSUS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON

THE BROAD STRATEGIC CONCEPTS WHICH SHAPE OQR DEFENCES, AND A  
CONVICTION THAT THE BURDEN OF PROVIDING THEM IS HARED ON A  
NATION AND EQUITABLE BASIS BETWEEN NATIONS. NOW IS THE  
MOMENT FOR EACH MEMBER GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE THAT THE CONTRIBUTION  
WHICH IT MAKES TO OUR COMMON DEFENCE IS COMMENSURATE WITH THE  
INFLUENCE WHICH IT HOPES TO EXERCISE IN THE COUNCILS OF THE  
ALLIANCE.

14. IT IS NATURALLY ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO GIVE A MORE  
OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE SUCCESSFULLY  
TO DEFEND ITSELF WITH THE PRESENT MEANS AT ITS DISPOSAL BUT I  
DEEM IT MORE PRESENT NOT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT VARIOUS AMPODERABILITIES  
NEVER ABSENT FROM ANY CONFLICT, AND TO BASE MY ASSESSMENT ON THE  
KNOWN FACTS AS GIVEN TO ME BY ALL THE MILITARY EXPERTS OF THE  
ALLIANCE.

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END TEXT.

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 02 APR 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 30 NOV 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973NATO05836  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 12/31/79  
**Errors:** n/a  
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**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <22-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <10-Oct-2001 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING: SYG'S SUMMARY APPRAISAL  
**TAGS:** MCAP, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
SUNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
USDOCOSOUTH  
USLOSACLANT  
USCINCLANT

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005